Sudan: Famine risk expands to parts of South Darfur as drought compounds conflict

Attachments • Download Report (PDF | 516.93 KB) Key Messages • Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to remain widespread across Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile through January. Some populations will likely continue to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the worst conflict- and drought-affected locations, including Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tina of North Darfur; Dilling, Kadugli of South Kordofan and surrounding rural areas; El-Obeid and surrounding areas of North Kordofan; and among some internally displaced person (IDP) populations in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. • Compared with the projection that FEWS NET issued in August, more areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are now expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the harvest period, including additional areas of North Darfur (Dar As Salam, As Serief), West Darfur (Jebel Moon, Sirba), South Darfur (Sharg Aj-Jabal, Mershing, Nitega), East Darfur (Shia’ria) and parts of Soudari of North Kordofan. Drought has resulted in severely below-average harvest prospects and localized crop failure, while reduced agricultural labor opportunities, continued displacement, and sharply rising food prices will constrain household food access. In relatively calmer areas of southern Darfur and southern and eastern Greater Kordofan, below-average harvests will provide only limited seasonal relief, sustaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. • The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) now extends to parts of South Darfur, including Sharg Aj-Jabal, also known as East Jebel Marra, where IDPs are concentrated. Conflict has severely eroded household livelihoods, assets, mobility, and coping capacity, resulting in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. In two of four IDP camps assessed between late August and early September, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) by weight-for-height exceeded the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold, while food consumption outcomes and crude and under-five mortality rates indicated Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Although these findings do not establish a Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification, there is little household capacity to cope with further deterioration in food access. If drought-related crop losses drive substantially more displacement into the area such that food from local production, markets, and humanitarian assistance falls far short of the combined population’s minimum caloric requirements, the share of households with extreme food consumption deficits would increase. Given extremely high acute malnutrition in two camps, mortality would likely rise rapidly, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) would become the most likely outcome. • The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) also persists in previously identified areas of North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tina, Kutum, rural Al Fasher, Melit, and Tawila) and Greater Kordofan (Dilling, Kadugli of South Kordofan and surrounding rural areas). In these areas, the credible alternative scenario remains centered on conflict and exacerbated by anticipated below- to severely below-average harvests. Renewed escalation or severe restrictions on movement, trade, and humanitarian access, compounded by marginal to failed harvests, would likely further isolate households from food and income sources and drive starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. • Harvests will range from below to severely below average across most of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. September rainfall was severely below average across much of western Sudan, cementing the underperformance of the June-September seasonal rains and limiting crop recovery, particularly across large agricultural areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. The severe dry conditions are also reducing pasture and water access and driving early southward migration of pastoralists, increasing the risk of herder-farmer conflict as animals encroach on farmland. Livestock body conditions are also deteriorating, with reports of increased distress sales, falling livestock prices, and increased livestock deaths in parts of North and West Darfur. Key informants have also reported rising displacement from drought-affected areas to parts of Central and South Darfur, straining available local resources. The overall below-average harvest, with crop failure across many areas, will sustain atypically high food assistance needs through the harvesting period and likely drive higher needs amid an anticipated early start to the 2027 lean season. • Conflict escalated considerably in September 2026 along the major front lines, with major territorial gains in North Kordofan and parts of southern Blue Nile driving new displacements and disrupting livelihoods. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) launched its largest offensive since July in North Kordofan, seizing control of several key villages and Sodari town (Sodari locality), while fighting intensified around Abu Qa’ud, Umm Sumaima, Kazgil, and Hamrat El-Sheikh. The fighting displaced civilians toward El-Obeid (North Kordofan), Ad-Dabbah (Northern), and other safer areas. In Blue Nile, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) built off territorial gains in late August in Geissan and Kurmuk, capturing Jabal Kadam garrison on September 17. These gains put additional pressure on SAF positions around Ed-Damazine and the Roseires Dam near the Ethiopian border, underscoring Blue Nile's growing strategic significance. Along the front in North and West Darfur, fighting has continued between the RSF and SAF/Darfur Joint Forces (DJF) along the At Tina-Um Baru-Karnoi corridor and the Abu Qamra-Bir Saliba axis near the Chad border. Control of Kulbus and Bir Saliba (West Darfur) has remained highly contested, with DJF ultimately maintaining momentum and capturing Abu Sorug on August 30. These gains have increased pressure on El-Geneina, raising the likelihood of intensified fighting as both sides prepare for a major confrontation. • Intercommunal conflict has also continued, most notably between the Falata and Masalit tribes in Gereida Locality (South Darfur), and in the Kauda-Heiban area (South Kordofan) between SPLM-N forces and armed members of the Atoro/Otoro community. Clashes that escalated in mid-August in Kauda continued into early September, and included burning and looting of houses and villages, civilian deaths and displacement, and severe disruption to livelihoods. Drone attacks have also continued across the country, including a strike in Um Rawaba (North Kordofan) and on key infrastructure including the Umm Alila fuel depot east of Wad Madani (Al-Jazirah), Upper Atbara and Setit damcomplex (Gedaref), and the nearby Khashm al-Girba dam (Kassala). Overall, continued conflict and insecurity during September triggered new displacement of about 27,200individuals in North Kordofan, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, North Darfur, and South Darfur states. • Staple food and fuel pricescontinued to rise sharply across all markets in September 2026, driven by persistent inflation, conflict-related disruptions, supply chain constraints, liquidity shortages, and speculations around the expected below-average 2026 harvest. The SDG continued to weaken sharply against the USD, with average official and parallel market exchange rates up 22-29 percent from August and 64-123 percent higher than the same period last year. Fuel prices remained exceptionally high, 88 and 127 percent above February 2026 levels on the official and parallel markets, respectively, increasing transportation and marketing costs countrywide. Staple food prices continued to surge: millet, sorghum, and wheat grain prices increased 26-29 percent between July and August and again by 36-41 percent between August and September, while wheat flour increased 5 and 16 percent. The cumulative two-month increases have been sharpest in markets in Greater Darfur, reflecting the worst expected production losses and crop failure, tightening market supplies, and high transport costs, with little moderation in prices anticipated during the harvest period. • Health and nutrition outcomes continue to worsen across the country, driven by deteriorating food security and WASH and health care conditions. Funding cuts have accelerated the near-collapse of the health care system, driving closures and downsizing of health facilities across Sudan and severely reducing access to lifesaving healthcare. The few remaining hospitals are increasingly overwhelmed; for example, in Tawila, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operates the only 200-bed hospital serving around 600,000 displaced people, while cases of malaria and severe acute malnutrition continue to rise. With only 41 percent of the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan funded and an estimated 37 percent of health facilities out of service, millions face worsening barriers to assistance, healthcare, and nutrition services, contributing to deteriorating nutrition outcomes. In addition to the survey in IDP camps in Sharg Aj-Jabal, 20 SMART surveys were conducted during the lean season months between June and September across the country. Of these, 13 (65 percent) found GAM prevalence at Critical levels (15-29.9 percent), including six that exceeded 20 percent. • In August, humanitarian partners reached approximately 3.7 million people with in-kind and cash assistance, less than 20 percent of FEWS NET’s estimated population in need. The number reached in August represents an increase of about 8 percent in beneficiaries reached with in-kind assistance, predominantly in Greater Darfur, and an increase of 22 percent in beneficiaries reached with cash-based transfers compared to July. While August represents the largest reach for the third consecutive month, it remains deeply insufficient for the scale of need, particularly amid the expected severely below-average harvest prospects. Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan remain the center of WFP’s operational response, accounting for nearly three-quarters of all beneficiaries reached across Sudan during August.